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CONTAINERS AND THE PROBLEM OF
INTERPRETATION UNDER COGSA SECTION 4(5)
The extent of an ocean-going carrier's liability for lost or damaged cargo
is a major issue in the field of admiralty law. A carrier's liability presently
is determined by section 4(5)' of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
[COGSA].2 This section provides that neither the carrier nor the ship
shall be liable for loss or damage to cargo in an amount exceeding $500 per
package, or, in the case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit.' The liability issue under this section has been complicated
by problems in defining the term "package."
Historically, the carrier's liability fluctuated between absolute liability
and nearly absolute immunity for cargo damage. In the middle 1800's, the
common carrier was responsible for all loss or damage to cargo except that
caused by a public enemy or an act of God.4 With the introduction of bills
of lading as public documents of title,' this situation changed rapidly. The
46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970) RFADS IN PERTINENT PART:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall ... be or become liable for any loss or damage
to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500
per package. . ., or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight
unit, . . ., unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the
shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. . . By agreement be-
tween the carrier . . . and the shipper another maximum amount . . . may be
fixed: Provided, that such maximum shall not be less than the figure above named.
In no event shall the carrier be liable for more than the amount of damage actually
sustained. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible . . . for loss or
damage to or in connection with the transportation of the goods if the nature or
value thereof has been knowingly and fraudulently misstated by the shipper in the
bill of lading. (emphasis in original)
2 49 STAT. 1207 (1936) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970)). COGSA is
expressly limited in its coverage to contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of
the United States. 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1970). Although the statute does not include domestic
voyages within its coverage, a bill of lading may validly stipulate for COGSA coverage in such
voyages. Such a stipulation is known as the coastwise option. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970).
3 See note I supra. American courts have interpreted "per customary freight unit" to be
the unit of quantity, weight or measurement of the cargo customarily used as the basis of
calculation of the freight rate to be charged. General Motors Corp. v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 451 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1971); Stirnimann v. The San Diego, 148 F.2d 141 (2d
Cir. 1945); The Bill, 55 F. Supp. 780, 783 (D. Md.) aff'd mem. 145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944).
See Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 26 (1858). See New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 722, 725 (1847) (carrier chargeable as
insurer of goods, and accountable for any damage or loss of goods in course of conveyance,
except when damage or loss arises from inevitable accident).
I A bill of lading is a written contract acknowledging receipt of the described goods by
the carrier. A bill of lading renders the carrier responsible as custodian of the goods and is
an express written agreement for their transportation and delivery. Centennial Ins. Co. v.
Haley Transfer and Storage, Inc., 196 S.E.2d 822, 832, 18 N.C. App. 152 (1973); Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Miller, 32 Ill. App. 259 (1889). A bill of lading is also a document of title.
An indorsement of such a document enables title to goods to be transferred, or mortgaged as
security for an advance. T. SCRUTrON, CHARTERPARTIES AND BILLs OF LADING 2 (18th Ed. 1974).
The bill of lading as a document of title evolved out of the English law merchant. The
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legal effect given these documents enabled carriers, in the exercise of their
superior bargaining powers,6 to compel shippers to submit to the insertion
of exceptions limiting liability in bills of lading drafted by carriers.7 In
1893, Congress enacted the Harter Act' in an attempt to develop a statu-
tory solution that would be fair to both shipper and carrier. Under this act,
shipowners were liable for cargo damage caused by negligence, but were
exonerated from liability for faults in navigation and management of the
vessel.9 After World War I, further efforts to achieve uniformity culminated
in an international conference held in Brussels. The resultant Brussels
Convention,' 0 which established $500 minimum liability for cargo damage
caused by carriers, served as the basis for COGSA and the section 4(5)
limitation of liability provision."
document became important when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, rapid mail-
carrying steamers made it possible to bring the shipping documents to a market center far
in advance of the slower freight vessel. This development enhanced the negotiable character
of bills of lading and led to their commercial acceptance. A. KNAtrrH, AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN
BILLS OF LADING 117 (4th Ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as KNAUTH].
I Because groups of carriers could exert monopolistic control in the bargaining process,
they often dictated the terms of liability clauses. Shippers either consented to these terms or
did not send their freight overseas. Recupero, The Shipper's Right to Recover Under COGSA
For Damage to Containerized Cargo, 15 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 51, 52 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Recupero].
I Initially, the exculpatory clauses exempted the carrier from loss due to specifically
described hazards such as, for example, faults or errors in navigation and seizure of a ship
and cargo under legal process. As they developed, however, such clauses exempted carriers
from liability for the effects of their own negligence. Caterpiller Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expedi-
tor, 318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1963); Recupero, supra note 6, at 52. For examples of early
court attempts to control the proliferation of these exculpatory provisions, see Liverpool and
Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889); Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
Ch. 105, 27 STAT. 445 (1893) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1970)).
Under the Harter Act, shipowners are liable for damage or loss caused by negligence
or failure in loading, stowage, custody, care or delivery of lawful merchandise committed to
their charge. 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1970). If the shipowner uses due diligence to make his vessel
seaworthy before commencement of the voyage, he is exonerated from liability for faults and
errors in the navigation or management of the vessel. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1970). See
generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 147 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as GILMORE & BLACK]; KNAUTH, supra note 5, at 121.
"0 The Brussels Convention accepted the Hague Rules of 1921, which, in turn had been
based on the Harter Act provisions. KNAurH, supra note 5, at 125; H. LONGLEY, COMMON
CARRIAGE OF CARGO, § 1.05 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LONGLEY]. The sixteen nations that
signed or adhered to the convention intended it to serve the purposes of securing uniformity
in the laws of leading commercial countries on the subject of ocean bills of lading, and of
establishing greater protection for shippers in the handling of their goods. Recupero, supra
note 6, at 53. The latter goal, the protection of shippers, was accomplished by barring carriers
from limiting their liability to less than $500 per package or the real value of the goods,
whichever was the lesser. Crutcher, The Ocean Bill of Lading-A Study in Fossilization, 45
TUL. L. REv. 698, 719 (1971); Recupero, supra note 6, at 53.
" The United States ratified the Brussels Convention in 1935. KNAUTH, supra note 5, at
129. Ratification was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in May v. Hamburg-
Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktiengesellschaft, 290 U.S. 333 (1933). The May court held that
a shipowner, to be protected by the Harter Act, must either show his vessel to have been
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In recent years, controversy has arisen between carriers and shippers
concerning the definition of "package" within the meaning of section 4(5).
The basic problem stems from the advent of containerization and the
resultant changes in the shipping industry."z Containerization, which in-
volves the use of large reusable metal containers, 3 offers an efficient means
of carrying cargo, and has altered the principles of maritime shipping.'4
Containerization, however, has created difficulties in interpreting "pack-
age" under the act.
Congress' original purpose in passing section 4(5) was to set a reason-
able figure for damages below which a carrier would not be permitted to
limit his liability."8 Moreover, Congress also sought to prevent adhesion
contracts and to secure protection for shippers forced into unequal bargain-
seaworthy or prove that his servants used due diligence. Id. at 342. Carriers realized that this
burden of proof would entail more costly pretrial investigation and more extensive and costly
testimony at trial, and accordingly moved for the ratification of the convention. KNAUTH,
supra note 5, at 129. Congress was unsure whether the mere ratification of the treaty would
bind the American shipping industry. For example, one Senator questioned whether a treaty
between the United States and a foreign country would fully cover issues arising between an
American shipper and an American carrier. 79 CONG. REc. 13,341 (1935) (remarks of Sen.
White). For this reason Congress enacted COGSA to implement and make effective the terms
of the treaty already ratified. Recupero, supra note 6, at 54.
12 For an analysis of the changes in the shipping industry brought about by containeriza-
tion, see Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 507, 510-513 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Shipping Containers].
23 The Coast Guard defines a container as "an article of transport equipment other than
a vehicle or conventional packaging [that is] . . .strong enough to be suitable for repeated
use, [and is] specially designed to facilitate the carriage of goods by one or more modes of
transport without intermediate reloading." 49 C.F.R. § 420.3(3) (1976).
24 Containerization provides an economical method of handling, loading, stowing, dis-
charging and transferring hundreds of cartons simultaneously be means of mechanized equip-
ment. Thus, the need for the slow and costly manual method of individual package handling
is eliminated. Shipping Containers, supra note 12, at 510.
'" In Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1297 (2d Cir. 1974), the
Second Circuit stated that a court's principal objective must be to search for some degree of
certainty and predictability that would enable shippers, carriers, underwriters and courts to
determine the difficult question of what is the COGSA package. This search has been compli-
cated by the absence of any meaningful legislative history concerning a possible definition of
"package." See Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1968);
Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375
F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
"1 In discussing the COGSA provision, Senator White noted that "[o]ne of the outstand-
ing purposes of the proposed legislation [was] to increase the character and degree of respon-
sibility of the carriers; and the bill was designed in large measure in the interest of the
shippers rather than of the carriers." 79 CONG. REc. 13,341 (1935). Thus, the objective behind
the $500 limitation was to prevent a carrier from stipulating a value for cargo in a lesser
amount, and to do away with the then current limits imposed by carriers, usually $100 or
less. Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The hope was that
the $500 figure would insure that carrier liability was always something more than nominal.
David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-ship Co., 339 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 976 (1965); Black, The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of Conflicting
Interpretation, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365, 367 (1973).
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ing positions.'7 The advent of containerization has made these policy objec-
tives difficult to attain. Court decisions holding that a container is a
"package" for liability limitation purposes have served to exonerate car-
riers from liability for damage resulting from negligent carriage.'8 Decisions
holding that containers are packages create different standards of liability
for containerized cargo than for cargo shipped by less modern means,
generate extensive litigation, and allow ocean carriers to insulate them-
selves from liability.'9
The prevailing standard for resolving the container/package question
was developed in the Second Circuit. The test originated in a dissenting
opinion written by Judge Hays in Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S.
Hong Kong Producer. 0 Hays argued that the container was the package
" See Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor, 318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1963). See
generally Comment, 27 TEx. L. REv. 525 (1949).
'" Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 543 F.2d 967 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976) (carrier's liability limited to $500 for negligent loss of container
holding goods valued in excess of $100,000); Royal Typewriter Co. v. MN Kulmerland, 483
F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973) (carrier's liability limited to $500 for loss of cargo valued at $29,000).
See generally, Shipping Containers, supra note 12.
'1 Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the Container Revolution, 1 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 203, 223 (1970).
There can frequently be a different standard of liability limitation for containerized cargo
than for cargo shipped by less modem means. If a container were loaded with 120 typewriters
valued at $10,000, the maximum liability if the container is considered the package is $500.
If, however, the shipper does not use a container, but rather ships his typewriters twelve to
the carton, his recovery could reach a maximum of $5,000 if the carton is deemed the package
for COGSA purposes.
In Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandsten Lines, Inc., 543 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976),
the court stated that the shipper gets a 10% reduction in freight rates by using containers
instead of independent packaging. Id. at 970. This reduction would enable the shipper to
obtain additional insurance to cover the decreased liability of the carrier of containerized
cargo. Id.
One commentator noted that to suggest insurance as the answer to legal problems is an
abdication of the judicial function. Simon, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Liability of
Wharfingers, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 513, 518 (1972). A court must attempt to interpret the
meaning of the COGSA package provision instead of circumventing this obligation by sug-
gesting that insurance will cover cargo losses. Id. Furthermore, any reduction in freight rates
received by the shipper would not be sufficient to compensate for cargo loss above the liability
limits of the carrier. E. SELVIG, UNrr LiMrrATION OF CARIER'S Lkusrry § 3.85 (1961).
20 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970), Encyclopedia Britannica
concerned a claim for damages to 1300 cartons of encyclopedias. The cartons were part of a
shipment of 4080 cartons packed into eight metal containers, only two of which were stowed
below deck. The other six were carried above deck where they were damaged by sea water
seepage. The short form bill of lading signed by the shipper contained no notice that the
containers were to be carried as deck cargo. Id. at 9.
Interpretation of § 1304(5) was not a major issue in Encyclopedia Britannica. Instead,
the central question dealt with the validit' of the carrier's long form bill of lading. Id. at 11.
This document gave the carrier the option of carrying cargo above or below deck. The longer
bill of lading also provided that the carrier would not be liable for damage to goods carried
on deck unless the shipper could affirmatively prove the carrier's negligence. Id. at 10. The
court held this long form invalid for several reasons. First, the bill contained no information
as to how the stowage option was exercised. Id. at 16. Second, the liability clause was imper-
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for limitation of liability purposes since the parties intended that each
container be considered a "functional" packing unit. 1 This theory later
served as the basis for the Second Circuit's decision in Royal Typewriter
Co. v. MIV Kulmerland.22 The court held in Royal Typewriter that the
container is not the COGSA package when the contents of the container
could have been shipped in the individual packages or cartons packed by
the shipper.? Where, for purposes of overseas shipments the shipper's own
packing units are functional,u a presumption arises that the container is
not the intended "package. '2 5 The carrier may overcome the presumption
by producing evidence that the parties intended to treat the container as
the "package. '2 6 If the packing units were not functional, however, the
shipper must show by other evidence that his units were themselves
"packages." Such evidence might include custom and usage in the trade,
missible under COGSA as an agreement in a contract of carriage that attempted to relieve
the carrier from liability for lost or damaged goods. Id. at 16; see 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1970).
The court thus held that the bill of lading designated below deck stowage. Consequently,
the placement of containers above deck was held as unreasonable deviation from the contract
of carriage, and the carrier was therefore unable to benefit from the $500 per package limita-
tion. 422 F.2d at 18; see 46 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1970). The majority made no mention of what
constituted the package for COGSA purposes.
Judge Hays dissented on the basis that the short form bill of lading contained language
referring to the longer document. Hays contended that the shipper had an opportunity to
study the long bill of lading at the time the contract was made. 422 F.2d at 19 (Hays, J.,
dissenting). Hence, the shipper should not complain of the document's provisions after the
damage had occurred. Id. Hays also determined that COGSA provisions applied indepen-
dently of any contract and that therefore, the contract of carriage could not deny the carrier
his rights under the statute. Id. at 20.
Hays argued that the intent of the parties indicated that the containers were considered
packages. Id. The evidence indicated that the containers were delivered to the carrier by the
shipper's agents already packed with the cartons. Id. On the bill of lading under "No. of
pkgs." was marked "(1) one metal container said to contain 536 ctns. of bound books." Id.
Hays submitted that because the parties intended the containers to be the functional packing
units the $500 per package limitation should apply to containers. Id. Hays contended that
this would promote predictability since the intent of the parties as evidenced by the bill of
lading would determine the COGSA package for liability purposes. Id.
21 Hays did not define the term "functional" as used in conjunction with shipping units.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 20 (2d Cir. 1969).
21 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). In Royal Typewriter the shipper sued a carrier for the loss
of 350 cartons of adding machines worth $29,000. The court of appeals found that because
the cartons were not packed in the container, the parties intended the container to be the
package for shipping and liability purposes. Id. at 649. Moreover, the shipper had classified
the container as the package on the bill of lading. Id.
23 Id. at 648.
24 The court in Royal Typewriter defined "functional" as meaning suitable for ocean
transportation or handling. Id. This definition was derived from the definition of "package"
found in BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1262 (4th ed. 1951): a "bundle put up for transportation or
commercial handling. . . a thing in form suitable for transportation or handling." The Royal
Typewriter court found that the typewriter cartons did not fall within this definition because
the cartons were too fragile for overseas shipment. 483 F.2d at 649. Thus, the court held the
cartons were not functional packing units. Id.
25 483 F.2d at 649.
21 Id.
1978]
306 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
the parties' characterizations of the cartons in the contract of carriage, or
other factors bearing on the parties' intent.Y The Royal Typewriter court
concluded its analysis by stating that its test, labeled the "functional
economics test," 8 was designed to provide a common sense standard '
under which parties could contractually allocate loss and determine insur-
ance needs."0
The Second Circuit later applied the functional economics test in
Cameco, Inc. v. SS American Legion," a case involving liability for the
theft of a quantity of canned hams shipped in a refrigerated container.2
The court found that the individual cartons, not the container, were the
"packages" for COGSA purposes because the hams were shipped in corru-
gated cartons of the type used for breakbulk shipments." The individual
cartons were therefore determined to be functional packing units34 and the
burden of proof shifted to the carrier to supply evidence at trial that the
parties intended to treat the container as a package." The carrier was
unable to supply such evidence and consequently the liability limitation
was calculated at $500 per carton rather than $500 per container. 6 Thus,
27 Id.
28 Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1298 (2d Cir. 1974).
2 483 F.2d at 649. A better approach to the limitation of liability issue can be derived
from Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 902 (1959). Gulf Italia, while not a container case, enunciated certain principles that
could provide guidance for resolution of the issue of whether containers are packages. In this
case, the carrier admitted responsibility for damage to a tractor, but maintained that the
tractor was a package and that his liability was limited to $500. The shipper had prepared
the tractor for shipment by putting waterproof paper over some of its parts, and by partially
encasing the superstructure with wooden planking. Id. at 136. The Gulf Italia court held that
the tractor was not a package and could not be considered a package under any ordinary
construction of the word. Id. at 137.
Gulf Italia established the rule that cargo that would not be a package within the purview
of a layman's understanding does not become a package merely because the cargo was pre-
pared for ocean transport. Id.; see text accompanying notes 70-71 infra. The rule suggests that
a container is not a COGSA package since containers do not fall within the ordinary construc-
tion of the term "package." Bissell, The Operational Realities of Containerization and Their
Effect on the "Package" Limitation and the "on-Deck" Prohibition: Review and Suggestions,
45 TUL. L. REV. 902, 912 (1971); accord, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.,
491 F.2d 960, 963 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). Contra, Mitsubishi Int'l cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963).
483 F.2d at 649.
' 514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974).
32 Id. at 1295.
3 Id. at 1299.
"Break-bulk" refers to packaged, nonfungible cargo. R. DE KERCHOVE, INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME DICTIONARY 97 (1948). Break-bulk shipments constituted the traditional precontai-
ner form of cargo shipment. Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894,
900 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
"' Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 900 (W.D. Whash.
1976); see text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
1 Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 900 (W.D. Wash.
1976).
3' Id. The Royal Typewriter and Cameco holdings have been summarized in the following
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the Cameco court, using the functional economics test, arrived at an equi-
table and logical result."
Nevertheless, the functional economics test is not an acceptable solu-
tion to the limitation of liability problems caused by containerization. 8
Shippers, when using containers, can avoid having their containers
deemed packages only if they ship goods in cartons safe enough so that the
goods could have been shipped without containers. 9 Any shipper who
switches from break-bulk to modern containerization must continue to use
the same obsolescent and costly casings he always used, or forego any
recovery over $500 for loss or damage to the containerized shipment. 0 The
shipper is therefore unable to use cheaper materials in his packaging prep-
aration which is one of the primary advantages of containerization.41
Furthermore, the Royal Typewriter test affords the shipper no predicta-
bility as to what will be the COGSA package and causes confusion in the
allocation of cargo insurance costs" and in the declaration of excess value.43
manner: "When a shipper containerizes 500 cartons of canned ham, the cartons packages
because it is usual for him to ship canned hams in cartons; but when a shipper containerizes
350 cartons of adding machines, the containers are not packages. . . because before contai-
nerization, it would have been risky to use cartons without wooden cases." Simon, More on
the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 603, 610-11 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as More on the Law of Shipping Containers].
Judge Feinberg stated in a concurring opinion that although problems arise from the
application of the functional economics test, he believed that the court was bound to apply
the test, and that in Cameco an equitable ruling resulted. 514 F.2d at 1300 (Feinberg, J.,
concurring). See generally text accompanying notes 38-48 infra.
2 DeOrchis, The Container and the Package Limitation-The Search For Predictability,
5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DeOrchis]; Shipping Containers, supra
note 12.
11 483 F.2d at 648. Since a functional carton is one which is suitable for break-bulk
shipment without any other protection necessary, there would be no advantage for a shipper
to use a container and face restrictive liability limitations. Id. at 649. The shipper receives a
10% freight reduction when using containers but this does not offset the risk to a cargo-
owner's insurer if the carrier's liability is limited to $500 for a containerful of goods. DeOrchis,
supra note 38, at 253; Diplock, Conventions and Morals-Limitation Clauses in International
Maritime Conventions, 1 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 525, 528 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Diplock].
Shipping Containers, supra note 12, at 520-32.
' Id. at 512; Note, Containerization and Intermodal Service in Ocean Shipping, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 1077, 1087 (1969).
42 Cargo damage suits often involve the question of the allocation of risk between the
cargo underwriter, and the carrier's protection and indemnity insurer. See, e.g., Cameco, Inc.
v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974); Royal Typewriter Co. v. MN Kulmer-
land, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). The gross cost of transportation insurance for the cargo
owner includes the premium paid his own underwriter plus the carrier's insurance expense
which is incorporated in the freight rate. Diplock, supra note 39, at 527. The Cameco court
asserted that imposing a burden of proof allocating risk according to the manner in which
goods initially are packaged would give more predictability to the allocation process. 514
F.2d at 1300. Carriers' insurers could determine from bills of lading how many containers
would be used without specification of the contents, and how many would contain a specific
number of packages. Id. These determinations would enable both shipper and carrier to
calculate insurance rates that accurately reflect risks. Id.
The distribution of risk, however, is not the major factor in the liability area. A limitation
of liability standard should impose upon the carrier liability for loss or damage sufficient to
1978]
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The carrier has no way of knowing how a shipper's sealed container is
packed,44 and the shipper cannot know whether the package he uses is
functional until it is so determined in a law suit.45 Such suits usually entail
lengthy trials with maritime experts testifying as to packaging materials
and practices.46 Therefore, by making the intent of the parties, rather than
the policy considerations behind COGSA,47 the touchstone for applying
liability limitations to containerized shipments, the Royal Typewriter de-
cision obscures the meaning and purpose of section 4(5).11
provide commercial inducement to undertake precautions. Diplock, supra note 39, at 526-28.,
cf., Note, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALz L.J. 1174, 1188 (1966) (liability
standard should be high enough to induce shipowners to maintain seaworthy vessels). The
costs of such precautions would be economically justified by the reduction of the risk of loss
or damage to the goods. Diplock, supra note 39, at 527. This cost would be reflected in the
freight charge to the shipper, but would be compensated for by the shipper's reduced insur-
ance premiums. Id. If the container is deemed the package and the liability limited to $500
per container, the commercial inducement is absent. Id. A carrier has no economic motivation
to provide safety precautions for his cargo when he knows that his maximum loss will be $500
per container. Id; see cases cited supra note 18.
One authority suggests that a no-fault system of liability should exist. Carrier liability
would be extended to the full value of the goods on the theory that such liability would
motivate carriers to exercise a degree of care costing an amount equal to loss of goods thereby
averted. This result would put the economy of cargo carriage in a desirable state of equilib-
rium. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 9, at 191.
13 If a shipper wishes to increase liability for a particular item, he may declare the nature
and value of the good in the bill of lading. See 46 U.S.C. 1304(5) (1970). This declaration of
excess value results in an increased freight charge. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E.
Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Carribbean Produce
Exch., Inc. v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 88 (D.P.R. 1976). Such procedures would
not benefit the shipper if carton is considered a package, because there would be no opportun-
ity for a special declaration at a higher charge. The shipper operates under the assumption
that the packages he delivers, and not the container, are the packages for COGSA purposes.
Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375
F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1967) (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
" The issue of whether a container is a COGSA package only arises when the shipper
packs and seals containers supplied by the carrier. Simon, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the
Liability of Wharfingers, 3 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 513, 517 (1972). A carrier cannot pack a
container without the knowledge of the shipper and thereby unilaterally limit his liability by
maintaining that the container is the package. Id. When the shipper packs a container,
however, all the carrier has knowledge of is the "Shippers Load and Count" as it appears in
the bill of lading. Id. The carrier is unable to verify the number of cartons in a packed and
sealed container delivered to it. Id. Even though the carrier is unaware of the contents of a
sealed container, he is protected by the § 1304(5) provision absolving him from responsibility
for loss or damage if the shipper fraudulently completes the bill of lading. See 46 U.S.C. §
1304(5) (1970).
,5 Stowage of containers aboard ship takes place under the supervision of the carrier after
the cargo has left the control of the shipper or his agent. Angus, Legal Implications of "The
Container Revolution" in International Carriage of Goods, 14 McGiLu L.J. 395, 408 (1968).
Shippers' cartons may fail to be functional when subjected to stressed or which shippers are
unaware. Id.
46 Shipping Containers, supra note 12, at 523.
" See note 16 supra.
' 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) was passed to protect shippers from being victims of adhesion
clauses in bills of lading. See text accompanying notes 5-11 supra. The intent of the contract-
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The Second Circuit's decision in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S.
Mormaclynx5 also casts doubt on the value of the functional economics
test for purposes of determining whether a container is a COGSA package.
Leather's Best involved a cargo of leather shipped in a carrier's container
which was stolen in port while under the control of the carrier." The court
of appeals, affirming the district court's finding that .the container was not
a package for COGSA purposes, held that the COGSA packages were the
bales of leather prepared by the shipper.51 The Leather's Best court rea-
soned that the word "package" was more sensibly related to the unit in
which a shipper packed the goods than to containers which are functionally
a part of the ship.52 A broad reading of the Leather's Best decision would
resolve the interpretive problems generated by the use of containers in
ocean-going carriage. 3 The Leather's Best analysis, however, is confined
to situations where the shipper prepared a large cargo unit such as a bale
and does not deal with the question of whether individual cartons packed
in a container should be considered COGSA packages. 5
Another significant attempt to resolve the limitation of liability contro-
versy occurred in Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische
Dampfschifffahrts - Gesellschaft5 5 Standard Electrica, which dealt with
palletized cargo,5" developed the "bundle put up for transportation" 7 anal-
ysis which supports the argument that containers are packages for COGSA
ing parties should not be allowed to interfere with this objective of COGSA. The parties'
intent should not be relevant because of contract of carriage is an adhesion contract in which
the shipper has no real intent, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 36 at
615.
"' 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 806. The district court in Leather's Best held that a carrier is responsible for
the care and custody of a container when discharged before the time the shipment was
supposed to be accepted by a shipper or his consignee. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Morma-
clynx, 313 F. Supp. 1373, 1382 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), modified at 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
1 451 F.2d at 815; see 313 F. Supp. at 1380.
52 451 F.2d at 815. The analysis in Leather's Best is supported by the Second Circuit's
analogous decision in Shinko Boeki Co. v. S.S. Pioneer Moon, 507 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1974).
The Shinko Boeki court held that tanks used to carry liquids were functionally a part of the
ship and not subject to the $500 limitation of liability provision. Id. at 345. The same factual
principles and statutes apply to both packaged and unpackaged goods and therefore they
should be treated similarly. If a container is not a package for "bulk" cargo, then the con-
tainer should not be the COGSA "package" when stuffed with cartops or similar "break-
bulk" cargo. More on the Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 36, at 608.
3 Courts, by always viewing the container as an appurtenance of the ship, would elimi-
nate the need for the case-by-case analysis required by the functional economics test. See text
accompanying 44-46 supra.
11 451 F.2d at 815; see DeOrchis, supra note 38, at 263. The Leather's Best ruling also
left open the question of package limitation under other circumstances such as when contain-
ers are owned by a shipper or freight forwarder without passing down a formula or test to
guide in filling the vacuum. Id.
375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
51 Palletizing is a method of stowing cargo on rectangular trays for handling by fork lift
trucks. R. DE KERCHOVE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DICTIONARY, 562 (2d ed. 1961).
5' 375 F.2d at 946.
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purposes. In Standard Electrica the cargo was characterized as "palletized
units" in the dock receipt, the bill of lading, and the letters between the
carrier and the shipper.18 The court determined that such characterizations
were entitled to considerable weight because the documents indicated that
both parties had the same understanding of what constituted a package,
and that the characterizations in the documents further reflected the
meaning given "package" by the custom and usage of the trade." Finally
the court labeled each pallet a package because the pallet had the physical
characteristics of a package and was clearly a "bundle put up for transpor-
tation."" The test created in the Standard Electrica decision requires
courts to consider the intent of the parties"' and whether the shipper pre-
pared the cargo unit in a manner to facilitate transport before ruling on
what constitutes a package under section 4(5).11
The "bundle put up for transportation" analysis is readily adaptable
to the problems of interpretation generated by the use of containers. 3 If
facilitation of transport warrants the classification of shipping pallets as
packages, the same rationale should apply in the case of containerization.
Language in Standard Electrica indicates that the developed test is
equally applicable to both palletized and containerized cargo shipments."
This language strengthens carriers' claims that where a shipper has chosen
to use a container and the bill of lading counts each container as one
package, the container should be considered the package for purposes of
determining a carrier's liability under COGSA."5
Id.
' Id. The Standard Electrica court recognized that the shipper could have obtained
added protection simply by declaring the nature and value of the goods and paying a higher
freight rate. Id.; see note 1 supra. Thus, the court saw no reason to extend protection to the
shipper beyond the $500 limitation. 375 F.2d at 946-47. The shipper should not have to pay
an added rate to protect his goods, but rather, COGSA should afford that safeguard since
the statute was enacted to protect the shipper. Simon, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Liabil-
ity of Wharfingers, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 513, 518 (1972).
'o 375 F.2d at 946.
1 Id; see text accompanying note 48 supra.
82 The court in Standard Electrica did not deem it important that the drafters of COGSA
had not foreseen the development of containerization, and consequently the problems in
applying the term "package" to containerized cargo. Rather, the court determined that
Standard Electrica would elminate confusion over the meaning of the word "package" as used
in 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970). 375 F.2d at 946-47.
" The defendant carriers in Leather's Best relied on Standard Electrica in arguing that
the container was the "package" for COGSA purposes. 451 F.2d at 815.
11 375 F.2d at 945. The Second Circuit applied the "bundle put up for transportation"
analysis to both palletized and containerized shipments. The court wrote that "[flew, if any,
in 1936 could have foreseen the change in the optimum size of shipping units [and] it is now
common for carriers to receive cargo from their shippers in a palletized form or 'containerized'
form." Id.
"S The Leather's Best court distinguished its decision from Standard Electrica on a
factual basis, stating that pallets and containers could not be treated the same for liability
purposes. The court indicated that the size of the pallet could not be compared to the size of
the containers. 451 F.2d at 815.
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The Standard Electrica analysis raises the issue of whether the descrip-
tion on a bill of lading is important evidence of the parties' understanding,
since such documents are drafted by the carrier and completed as a matter
of course by the shipper or his agent."6 A primary purpose for enacting
COGSA was to counteract the persistent efforts of carriers to insert all-
embracing limitations on their liability in fine print clauses in bills of
lading. 7 A disadvantage of the Standard Electrica holding is that the test
encourages litigation in much the same manner as Royal Typewriter.6"
Shippers and carriers often would have opposing views as to what shipping
unit was or was not the COGSA package. 9
11 Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 905 (W.D. Wash.
1976); Chiang, The Applicability of COGSA and the Harter Act to Water Bills of Lading, 14
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 267, 282 (1972-73).
87 Tessler Bros., (B.C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1974); Federal
Ins. Co. v. Transconex, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 290, 295 (D.P.R. 1976). See generally GILMORE AND
BLACK, supra note 9.
6' Enumerating the number of packages in a container on the bill of lading will compli-
cate the litigation process. For example, controversy may arise where the shipper, in prepar-
ing the information for the bill of lading, specifies the number of packages, but the carrier,
prior to signing and issuing the bill of lading, refuses to include the number of packages in
the container on the ground that the carrier cannot verify this number. Simon, Admiralty
Jurisdiction and the Liability of Wharfingers, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 513, 517 (1972).
"' Courts in suits involving shipments in which some preparations for transportation were
made have reached inconsistent results. See, e.g., Nichimen Co. v. M/V Farland, 462 F.2d
319 (2d Cir. 1972) (coils of steel weighing three to nine tons strapped by metal band, held
packages); Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963) (boxed rolls of steel weighing 32 2 tons, held packages); Petition
of Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953) (locomotives stowed on rail and timber beds
and secured by wire lashings held not packages); Island Yachts, Inc. v. Pacific Lakes Line,
345 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (yacht lashed to wooden shipping cradle held package);
Middle E. Agency v. The John B. Waterman, 86 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (rock crusher
fastened to wooden skid held package).
Tests for determining what is a package range from applying the plain, ordinary meaning
of the term, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc., 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.
1974); Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1959), to applying
the standard that a package includes any class of cargo, regardless of size, shape or weight,
to which some packaging preparation has been made, but which does not necessarily conceal
or enclose the goods. See Aluminios Pozuelo, Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1968); Lucchese v. Malabe Shipping Co., 351 F. Supp. 588 (D.P.R. 1972). One authority
argues that to be considered a package the cargo must be completely enclosed. See LONGLEY,
supra note 10, at 210. Another court has interpreted "package" to mean the largest single
unit delivered to the carrier by the shipper. See Omark Indus. v. Associated Container Trans.,
Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 139, 142 (D. Ore. 1976). An Italian decision interpeting COGSA held that
a case containing 25 tons of machinery was not a package for limitation purposes. F.I.A.T.
v. American Export Lines, 1960 Ie. Dir. Mar. 197, C.A. Genoa 15, 7, 1959 (July 15, 1959).
The court reasoned that cargo was shipped in packages to facilitate handling, but that a
preparation for transportation analysis was not applicable when the case weighed 25 tons.
Id. A survey of these decisions indicates the problems that exist in attempting to achieve a
uniform and predictable interpretation of the meaning of the COGSA "package." Comment,
Interpreting COGSA: The Meaning of "Package. "30 MIAMI L. REv. 169, 180 (1976). One court
has stated that judicial manipulations of the meaning of the word "package" has led to a
treatment of the term as a sophisticated or esoteric term of art. Omark Indus. v. Associated
Container Trans., Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 139, 141 (D. Ore. 1976).
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The "bundle put up for transportation" analysis also would serve to
penalize the shipper who acts to protect his cargo. Any shipping prepara-
tion, to the extent that it protects cargo, facilitates handling. 0 Efforts to
minimize risk through the use of outside covering or reinforcement could
be characterized as preparations to facilitate transport under the Standard
Electrica test. 1 Such a characterization would result in the pallet or con-
tainer being classified as a package for limitation of liability purposes
within the meaning of section 4(5).11
In a recent case dealing with containers, Matsushita Electric Corp. v.
S.S. Aegis Spirit,73 a district court criticized much of what previously had
been said on the limitation of liability issue. Matsushita involved a suit
for damages to a containerized shipment of electrical appliances resulting
from concussive forces and the entry of sea water into the containers during
the voyage.74 The court reasoned that any satisfactory test for determing
whether a container is a package must reflect the realities of the maritime
industry, while adhering to the express language of the COGSA provi-
sions.7" The Matsushita court looked to Leather's Best as a guide and
concluded that a container is merely part of ship's transport equipment
and not a COGSA package. 6
Concomitantly, the Matsushita court rejected the functional economics
test developed in Royal Typewriter as being commercially impracticable,
unwise, and contrary to the language of the statute.77 The court asserted
that section 4(5) distinguishes only between goods shipped in packages and
goods not shipped in packages. There is no indication in COGSA that
goods shipped in cartons, crates or other receptacles should not be consid-
ered packaged goods because shippers' packaging falls below some later
established standard of strength and durability." The Matsushita court
" Companhia Hidro Elec. v. S.S. Loide Honduras, 368 F. Supp. 289, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
71 Id. at 292. The court in Companhia Hidro Elec. v. S.S. Loide Honduras held that
protective covering, whether complete or partial, should be considered as constituting a
package within § 4(5) of COGSA. Id. The court determined that this holding would prevent
a shipper from being limited to a $500 recovery for completely enclosed goods, whereas
another shipper could recover on a customary freight unit basis because he had allowed some
indestructible part of the cargo to protrude from the package. Id; see Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd.
v. S.S. Navigator. 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968) (skid attached to toggle press, although protect-
ing machine, facilitated delivery making press'an article "put up for transportation").
72 See text accompanying notes 64 and 65 supra.
13 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
", Id. at 898.
75 Id. at 903.
78 Id. at 907.
" Id. at 906.
7' Id. at 904.
T' Id. The Matsushita court reasoned that applying the functional economics test to
hypothetical break-bulk carriage conditions compels courts to make conjectural determina-
tions concerning the intent of the parties, and requires evidentiary production of a kind never
contemplated by COGSA framers. Id; see Angus, Legal Implications of "The Container
Revolution" in International Carriage of Goods, 14 McGu.L L.J. 395, 408 (1968).
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determined that the functional economics test penalizes shippers who avail
themselves of the more economical packaging made possible through con-
tainerization. ° Such shippers face the prospect of increased liability due
to the container being deemed the COGSA package.8 This result violates
the principle that courts should foster good commercial practices and re-
frain from creating disincentives to mercantile economization. 2 The
Matsushita court also criticized the intent requirement of the functional
economics test by stating that if carriers are allowed to christen an item a
"package," when such christening distorts or belies the plain meaning of
the word as used in the statute, then the liability floor would become
illusory.0
A holding that the container is transport equipment and functionally
a part of the ship recognizes the plain meaning of "package" as used in
section 4(5). If the individual crates or cartons prepared by the shipper can
be characterized as "packages," they do not lose that character upon being
stowed in a carrier's container." Thus, containers should be regarded as
detachable compartments of the ship and not as cargo "packages.", The
decision in Matsushita should effectuate the purpose of COGSA by pro-
tecting the shipper and establishing a minimum amount below which car-
riers subject to COGSA could not reduce their liability for cargo damage.
The workability of the Matsushita standard is further evidenced by the
manner in which the standard can be applied to reach equitable results in
a new area of conflict. To be useful, any test which is developed must deal
with the limitation of liability questions surrounding the use of "lighter
aboard ship" (LASH) cargo barges. The LASH system involves the use of
rectangular steel containers with a cargo capacity of 370 tons.87 A LASH
barge serves a dual function in that it is a barge that can be towed from
point to point, and a container designed to be carried aboard a larger vessel
80 414 F. Supp. at 904; see text accompanying note 41 supra. The court in Matsushita
submitted that only the shipper's commercial benefits were considered' and, in effect, neu-
tralized by the test in Royal Typewriter. The carrier's commercial benefits, such as less time
in port and cheaper labor costs, were ignored under the test. See 414 F. Supp. at 904;
Leather's Best v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 451 F.2d
800 (2d Cir. 1971).
'3 414 F. Supp. at 904.
Id; see Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1959);
DeOrchis, supra note 38, at 257; Shipping Containers, supra note 12, at 523.
414 F. Supp. at 903; see note 69 supra.
', Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 907 (W.D. Wash.
1976).
" Cia. Panamena de Seguros v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D.C.Z.
1976); cf. In re Pacific Far E. Line, 314 F. Supp. 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1970), af'd per curiam, 472
F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1973) (containers used as carrying receptacles for cargo are part of
freighter's appurtenances and value thereof is includable in owner's interest in freighter for
liability purposes).
" See text accompanying note 16 supra.
"3 Georgia Ports Auth. v. L/S Bilderdyk, 402 F. Supp. 706, 707 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1975); Port
Royal Marine Corp. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 345, 349 (S.D. Ga.), afl'd, 420 U.S. 901
(1974).
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in "piggy back" fashion.88 Virtually every court decision involving LASH
barges has labeled them containers. 9 Consequently, if containers are con-
sidered packages, the LASH barges likely will also be deemed COGSA
packages. Shippers may thus face the possibility that carriers will be only
liable to the extent of $500 for damages to cargo shipments of 370 tons.
The Matsushita rationale, however, effectively would preclude this ine-
quitable result. Under the Matsushita analysis, the goods within the barge
would be "packages" for COGSA purposes and the LASH barge would be
considered an appurtenance of the vessel. 0 Such a result protects the
shipper more than a holding that the barge is the package under section
4(5).
Current international discussions concerning the limitation of liability
issue do not reinforce the Matsushita holding that containers are func-
tional parts of a ship." Nevertheless, the United States' position favoring
shippers throughout the discussions indicates government policy against
categorizing containers as COGSA packages. In February of 1968, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and eighteen other countries signed
the Brussels Protocol to the 1924 Hague Rules. 2 In negotiating the Proto-
col, the United States, cognizant of the ramifications of containerization,
originally proposed a limitation equal to $3.70 per pound. 3 This position
was abandoned as a result of opposition claiming that the per pound provi-
Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally Hickey,
Legal Problems Relating to Combined Transport and Barge Carrying Vessels, 45 Tot. L. REV.
863 (1971).
" See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1970); Georgia Ports
Auth. v. L/S Bilderdyk., 402 F. Supp. 706, 707 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1975); Port Royal Marine Corp.
v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 345, 349 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Wirth Ltd. v. S.S. Acadia Forest,
376 F. Supp. 785, 787 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd 537 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1976).
o Although courts have not yet considered the problem, the dual function of the LASH
barge may complicate the interpretation process. The LASH barge has not been labeled a
container, see cases cited note 89 supra, but the barge also has been deemed a ship for liability
limitation purposes. In Wirth Ltd. v. S.S. Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976),
the court indicated that LASH barges meet federal design and registry standards and are
authorized to engage in foreign trade to and from the United States. Therefore, these barges
must be considered ships when determining liability. Id. at 1279. Similarly, a Georgia district
court, holding that a LASH barge was a ship, pointed out that the barges are documented
vessels that carry their own registry papers on board. Port Royal Marine Corp. v. United
States, 378 F. Supp. 345, 349 (S.D. Ga. 1974). As yet, no court has addressed the issue of
whether a barge is the COGSA "package."
"1 The international discussion of the Hague Rules involved increasing the $500 liability
limit, or adding a per pound of cargo rate for limitation of liability purposes. See text accom-
panying notes 103-105 infra. The international conferees did not consider treating a container
as a transport appurtenance of the vessel and thus not a COGSA "package." See Sweeny,
The Uncitral Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 7 J. MAR. L. & Com. 327, 329
(1976).
92 Degurse, The "Container Clause" in Article 4(5) of the 1968 Protocol to the Hague
Rules, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 131, 144 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Degurse].
11 Id. at 137. Norway also suggested a limitation amount equal to $3.70 per pound of gross
weight. Norway's recommendation was made in an attempt to achieve uniform liability
among various if not all modes of transportation. Id.
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sion could not adequately compensate the shippers of low weight cargo of
high value. 4 The United States, however, continued to refuse to support
limits of liability that might place containerized cargo in a less favorable
position than that enjoyed by break-bulk cargo.95
The proposal that finally emerged had a dual unit standard with limits
of liability set at $622 per package or 90 cents per pound, whichever pro-
duced the greater liability. 6 The United States delegation did not favor
this formulation since if the package was the container, the shipper's re-
covery would be limited at the rate of 90 cents per pound. 7 To prevent this
result, the United States proposed the addition of a container clause which
the conference accepted as part of the final proposal. The container clause
reads:
"Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is'used
to consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enumerated
in the bill of lading as packed in such article of transport shall be
deemed the number of packages or units for the purposes of this
paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. Except
as aforesaid such article of transport shall be considered the pack-
age or unit."98 (emphasis supplied)
The solution to the limitation of liability problem with respect to
containers, however, probably will not come from an international treaty.9
Id. at 138.
, The United States delegation supported shippers' interests throughout the conference.
Not only was the delegation against any standard which would lead to the container being
labeled a COGSA "package," but the delegation also opposed Great Britain's argument for
increased rates for particularized bills of lading. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE SECOND MEETING OF THE TWELFTH SESSION OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON MARITIME
LAW 4, February 19-23, 1968 [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION].
" Degurse, supra note 92, at 139.
" Id. at 141.
" REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, supra note 95, at 13. The "container clause"
requirement of a statement in a bill of lading regarding the number of packages in a container
is unworkable, and should be rejected. Recupero, supra note 6, at 68. Ocean carriers usually
receive containers that have been sealed at the point of loading and therefore carriers have
no knowledge of the actual contents of such containers. See note 44 supra. Accordingly, the
requirements of the container clause will lead to disputes between shipper and carrier con-
cerning the actual contents of a container. Simon, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Liability
of Wharfingers, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 513, 517 (1972). Also, the container clause, by placing
undue significance on language in a bill of lading, would impede obtaining the COGSA
objective of reducing the controlling force of fine print clauses in bills of lading. Tessler Bros.,
(B.C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1974); Federal Ins. Co. v. Transco-
nex, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 290, 295 (D.P.R. 1976).
" The container clause has met with interpretive problems that have prevented the
Brussels Protocol from being brought before the Senate for ratification. Degurse, supra note
92, at 143. The British have read the container provision to mean that a higher freight rate
could be assessed against those shippers who wish to enumerate the number of packages in a
container. Id. This reading of the statute would allow carriers to charge unacceptably high
rates for enumerating the number of packages and put shippers back in a position where the
container is the package for liability purposes. The United States argues, however, that the
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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
No treaty has been negotiated and ratified, and the current international
conferences' on this subject influence the domestic resolution of the
"package" problem only in their capacity as a source of guidance to the
courts.'"' Meanwhile, the courts are attempting to resolve the issue by
defining the container according to its use. If the container is a functional
part of the ship, then it is not a package.'0 2 If the container works as a
functional form for overseas transportation of goods, then it is a package.',3
Both functions are fulfilled by the container. Thus, no single workable
guide has been established for the purpose of fixing liability under
COGSA.
The standard adhered to in Matsushita is the most workable in deter-
mining the COGSA "package" since under the Matsushita rationale, the
container is not a package, it is a functional part of the ship. The objectives
of uniformity and predictability are realized since both shipper and carrier
know that the individual cartons inside the container are the COGSA
packages for liability purposes. 4 This resolves the section 4(5) definitional
problems brought about by containerization. More importantly, the
Matsushita standard furthers the goals of COGSA by protecting the ship-
per. The underlying policy of section 4(5) was that carrier liability should
at all times be something more than nominal. 5 Matsushita insures this
policy by holding that the $500 liability limitation will apply to the indi-
vidual packages, not the containers. The application of this standard also
provides the necessary inducement to the carrier to protect cargo ship-
ments entrusted to him.' 0 Consequently, the Matsushita decision that
language of the container revision does not allow this rate adjustment. Id. This position is
strengthed by the Convention's rejection of a British proposal to permit the charge of addi-
tional rates to allow the shippers to enumerate the number of packages in a container. Id. at
141.
"® Revision of the existing liability provision of the Hague Convention has also been
extensively discussed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
[Unicitral]. Sweeny, The Uncitral Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 7 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 327 (1976). The Uncitral Working Group has considered several proposals ranging
from retention of the dual standard of the Brussels Protocol to the weight alone standard
supported by Norway and the United States. Id. at 328.
'I The district court in Leather's Best commented that the Brussels Protocol had set
limits of liability based on the number of packages enumerated in a bill of lading as packed
in a container or similar transport device. Leather's Best v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp.
1373, 1382 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). Since the shipper in Leather's Best had specified the number of
cartons on the shipping documents, the court ruled that the packages within the container
and not the container itself were the COGSA packages. Id. Similarly, a Florida district court
stated that the Brussels Protocol makes clear that each unit in palletized or containerized
cargo constitutes a package. The court held that each carton within a refrigerated container
was the COGSA package. Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Transp.,
Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
,02 Rath, Containers: Their Definition and Implications, 7 TRANSP. L.J. 53, 59 (1975).
103 Id.
"' See text accompanying note 44 supra.
,0 See David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-ship Co., 339 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1964);
Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
"I See note 42 supra.
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containers are appurtenances of the ship and not COGSA "packages"
should be recognized as providing a solution to the container limitation of
liability issue.
JoHN F. MuRPHY

